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Vulnerability of Professional-Client Privilege
in Shareholder Litigation*
By F. HODGE O'NEAL** and STEPHEN R. THOMPSON***
THE PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE AND SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
Lawyers and accountants often give corporate directors, officers or ma-
jority shareholders professional advice and assistance in charting corporate
courses of action that minority shareholders find objectionable. Especially
when a plan to eliminate a minority shareholder from a company (a
"squeeze-out") is being evolved, those in control of the company are likely
to ask the company's attorney and accountant for guidance, and the at-
torney or accountant may prepare letters or memoranda, or participate in
conferences, in which he describes methods and procedures to accomplish
the desired objective and points out advantages and disadvantages of alter-
native methods. The conferences of majority shareholders, directors, officers,
lawyers, accountants and other business advisers, as they search for the
most advantageous and least risky way of eliminating the minority share-
holder, may take on all the coloration of a full-fledged "plot" or "conspir-
acy." Businessmen, lawyers and accountants participating in transactions
of this kind usually consider their communications confidential, and the
thought probably never occurs to most of them that their scheming might
some day be laid bare before a court or jury.
In particular, lawyers generally assume that information communicated
by a corporate official to an attorney and the attorney's response are pro-
tected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.' When corporate
officials and the lawyer involved in a squeeze-play or other corporate trans-
action prejudicial to a minority shareholder learn that their communications
and documents, which reveal their plotting against a minority shareholder,
might not be privileged but instead might be subject to discovery, the shock
may set the stage for a settlement favorable to the minority shareholder.
* This article is based in part upon material in F. O'Neal, Oppression of Minority
Shareholders § 7.06 (Callaghan & Company, Chicago, 1975).
** James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University.
**". Student, Duke University School of Law, Class of 1976.
1. See, e.g., 4 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ch. 26 (2d ed. 1974);
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure ch. 6 (1970, Supp. 1976); C.
Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts, §§ 81-90 (2d ed. 1970, Supp. 1972).
The attorney representing a minority shareholder should not overlook the possibility
of obtaining depositions or other discovery before an action is brought in order to
preserve evidence. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 27.
For the use of interrogatories in an action by minority shareholders attacking the
sale of corporate assets to the majority shareholder, see Garbarino v. Albercan Oil
Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 27, 109 A.2d 824 (1954).
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And if the dispute does have to be litigated, the communications and docu-
ments might well provide information vital to the minority shareholder's
case or at least produce a sympathy-invoking climate conducive to a de-
termination favorable to him.
Interrogatories and other discovery tools can of course be used by a mi-
nority shareholder's attorney to obtain information useful in a derivative
suit or other litigation the shareholder is bringing to protect the corporation
or his own interests. During the last thirty years, the courts, especially the
federal district courts under the federal rules, have consistently permitted
broader and broader discovery. This article does not discuss discovery tech-
niques. Adequate text material on that subject is readily available else-
where. 2 Rather, it deals with challenges to the attorney-client or accountant-
client privilege when such a privilege is asserted to avoid disclosure of
communications between corporate officers and agents and a lawyer or
accountant.
BASIS AND SCOPE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is summarized in the often-quoted statement
of Professor Wigmore as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.3
Confidential communications from the client to the attorney are protected
from both pretrial discovery and the lawyer's testimonial disclosure. The
client cannot be compelled to disclose what he told the attorney, and the
attorney may not reveal his client's communications. The privilege "belongs"
to the client, not the lawyer, but the lawyer often asserts it on the client's
behalf.4 The purpose of the privilege is to encourage uninhibited communica-
tions between the client and the attorney by dispelling apprehension that they
will be compelled to disclose the communications.5 An attorney, it is thought,
2. "The confidential nature of our work is something most lawyers probably take
for granted." Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 I11. B.J. 542
(1968).
3. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as 8 J. Wigmore].
4. "The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim
the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authority to do so is presumed in
the absence of evidence to the contrary." Proposed Rule of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates 503(c), transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court on
November 20, 1972 (see 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972)), but not adopted by Congress
(see 65 F.R.D. 131, 146 (1974)).
5. 8 J. Wigmore § 2291, at 545. "The modern rationale of the privilege, since the
latter part of the eighteenth century, has been the policy promoting free consultation
of clients with their legal advisors." Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 8 Vill. L. Rev. 279, 305 (1963).
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best serves his client, and indirectly society, if he acquires all relevant infor-
mation about the client's case.6 As has been pointed out, "[t]he privilege
rests on the untested and essentially untestable assumption that the benefits
derived from encouraging communications outweigh the costs of keeping
the information from other parties."'7
The Wigmore summary of the attorney-client privilege indicates that only
communications by the client are protected from disclosure. It does not say
that communications from the lawyer to the client are protected. But, as
Wigmore points out, the courts protect a lawyer's responses to his client when
they are related to the confidence or their disclosure would tend to reveal
the contents of confidential communications from the client to the lawyer.8
Furthermore, information gathered by a lawyer in preparing for litigation is
protected by another rule, the so-called "work-product" rule. But the pro-
tection afforded by that rule is defeated by a sufficient showing of necessity. 9
A corporation's right generally to assert the attorney-client privilege in
litigation brought against it by parties outside the corporate family is firmly
established. 10 "[T]he attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available
6. See Model Code of Evidence rule 210, comment a (1942): "The social good
derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their
clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the
evidence in specific cases."
7. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test,
84 Harv. L. Rev. 424, 425 (1970). See also Kobak, The Uneven Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 Ga. L. Rev. 339
(1972).
8. 8 J. Wigmore § 2292, at 554; Id. § 2320. See also Schwimmer v. United States,
232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); In re Prudence-Bonds
Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), afl'd 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949). "The
lawyer's response to the client's communication is privileged because it must of neces-
sity reveal the substance of the original communication." Heininger, The Attorney-
Client Privilege as it Relates to Corporations, 53 111. B.J. 376, 377 (1965).
9. Generally, under the work-product rule, materials prepared by (or for) a lawyer
in anticipation of litigation or for trial (the "work product") are protected from dis-
covery, absent a showing of special necessity or justification for its production. In
addition, the lawyer's mental impressions, opinions, conclusions or legal theories are,
as a practical matter, completely immune from discovery. See generally, 8 C. A. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 1, §§ 2021-22. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 for the "work-product
rule" adopted for use in the federal courts. Rule 26 provides in part that the right to
discovery will override the privilege of confidentiality "upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case
and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the material by other means." State discovery rules are generally similar, but not
identical, and must be consulted when appropriate.
10. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied,' 375 U.S. 929 (1963). Model Code of Evidence rule 209(a) (1942); Uniform
Rule of Evidence 26(3) (1953 version); "A corporation, like any other 'client,' is
entitled to the attorney-client privilege." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 (1964).
See also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971), noted in 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1200 (1971), 45 Tul. L. Rev. 1063
(1971), 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 188 (1970), 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 925 (1971);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956); Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1950);
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to corporations."" Nevertheless, "there remains in many places a residual
feeling that the attorney-client privilege is not really appropriate and entitled
to full scope in the corporate arena. ' 12 Uncertainties as to what limitations
will be imposed on the privilege in a corporate setting 13 and recognized ex-
ceptions to the privilege open up opportunities for an aggrieved minority
shareholder to obtain information contained in communications between
corporate representatives and the corporation's attorney. The following para-
graphs suggest how those opportunities can be explored and utilized. Inci-
dentally, if a minority shareholder attempts to obtain information and the
corporation refuses discovery, invoking the attorney-client privilege, and the
court sustains the privilege, the corporation may not waive the privilege later
at the trial should it become advantageous to the corporation or its control-
ling shareholders and officers to disclose the information.1
4
In practical operation the reach of the attorney-client privilege in a cor-
porate setting is narrower than might be supposed. Corporate officers and
agents who provide an attorney with information-the attorney's sources-
can always be questioned by a shareholder-plaintiff's attorney as to matters
within their own knowledge.15 Further, preexisting corporate documents and
financial records not prepared for communicating with the corporation's
attorney are not immunized from discovery simply because they have been
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 Se.2d 352 (1943); Simon, The Attorney-
Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 953 (1956); Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (1969).
11. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
12. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. Law.
901, 913 (1969).
13. The court in the Radiant Burners case expressly declined to decide what limita-
tions were to be imposed on the privilege. Id.
14. While the client does not waive the privilege by testifying generally in the
cause or testifying as to facts which were the subject of consultation with his
attorney, if the client or his attorney at his instance takes the stand and testifies
to privileged communications in part this is a waiver as to the remainder of the
privileged consultation or consultations about the same subject.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185-86 (M.D.
Fla. 1973), citing inter alia, Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (B). See also United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952) ("It is ... one thing to allow the privileged
person to suppress the evidence, and, toto coelo, another thing to allow him to fill a
gap in his own evidence by recourse to what he suppresses.").
15. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831
(E.D. Pa. 1962) (The client "may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communi-
cation to his attorney.").
In most instances, therefore, the existence of the privilege merely means that
the attorney may not be called to impeach his own client or, in those instances
wherein the client may have chosen to take the risk of refusing to speak, that
the attorney may not be used as a vehicle for circumventing the client's con-
stitutional rights.
Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 Ala. Law. 352,
354 (1967).
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transmitted to the attorney and left in his ctistody.16 "All relevant facts of
which the corporation has knowledge, including the facts related by it to its
attorneys in privileged communications, are subject to discovery by inter-
rogatories directed to the corporation or depositions of corporate employ-
ees."" Documents from the corporation's general files which an attorney
uses in preparing his advice for the corporation do not achieve a privileged
status.
The rule establishing the attorney-client privilege should be strictly con-
strued, because, as Professor Wigmore has pointed out, "[i]ts benefits are
all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete."' s As a
minority shareholder faces serious obstacles in his preparation for trial, and
the risk is great that shareholder litigation will be wrongly decided for lack
of information, courts should not be reluctant in shareholder litigation, when
an appropriate situation arises, to find that the privilege does not apply or
that the case falls within an exception to the privilege.
WAYS OF ATTACKING PRIVILEGE IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
A minority shareholder bringing a derivative suit or other action against
the corporation or its directors or officers conceivably may be able to per-
suade the court that a corporation should never be able to invoke the
attorney-client privilege against a shareholder in an action brought by the
shareholder. After all, the corporation's funds (funds which belong deriva-
tively to all the shareholders) pay the attorney and the advice he gives is
supposedly for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders as a group.
Especially when the minority shareholder is bringing a derivative suit, which
is an action for and on behalf of the corporation and in which any recovery
generally goes to the corporation, it seems inappropriate to permit the cor-
poration's attorney-client privilege to be asserted in order to defeat the suit.
A number of courts have flatly held that the privilege is unavailable to a
16. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963) ("Certainly, the privilege would never be available
to allow a corporation to funnel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers
for custodial purposes and thereby avoid disclosure."); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (the attorney may
refuse to produce such documents only if the client could have refused to produce
them); 8 J. Wigmore § 2307. Cf. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211
F. Supp. 85, 88 n.12 (D. Del. 1962) ("This Court does not feel a corporation should
be able to insulate vital facts by using the privilege in a perverting manner.").
17. Heininger, supra note 8, at 377.
18. 8 J. Wigmore § 2292, at 554. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
The privilege must be placed in perspective. The beginning point is the funda-
mental principle that the public has the right to every man's evidence, and exemp-
tions from the general duty to give testimony that one is capable of giving are
distinctly exceptional. . . . An exception is justified if-and only if-policy re-
quires it be recognized when measured against the fundamental responsibility
of every person to give testimony.
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
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corporation in a suit brought by shareholders. 19 Although the number of
reported decisions dealing with a corporation's assertion of the attorney-
client privilege in shareholder litigation is small, the trend is clearly away
from this categorical position. Apparently, no federal court of appeals has
yet supported it. Rather than a complete absence of privilege, the generally
accepted view is that the shareholder-plaintiff may show cause why assertion
of the privilege is inappropriate on the particular facts of the case. 20
In a case arising in the Northern District of Alabama, 21 minority share-
holders in an insurance company brought a class action against the corpora-
tion, its directors, officers and controlling persons, seeking to recover the
purchase price of stock they had bought in the corporation. They alleged
violations of federal and state securities laws and common law fraud. They
also asserted a derivative action on behalf of the corporation against the
individual defendants on the ground that the corporation itself had been
injured by fraud in the purchase and sale of its securities, On deposition
plaintiffs asked Schweitzer, who had been the corporation's attorney at the
time of the transactions sued on but had later become its president, certain
questions concerning advice he had given the corporation on the issuance
and sale of stock, information the company had furnished him, and the
content of discussions at meetings he and company officials had attended.
The corporation and Schweitzer objected to the questions on the ground
that the attorney-client privilege barred his revealing communications to him
by the corporation while he was its attorney or the advice which he gave
19. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated and re-
manded, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), noted in
29 Ohio St. L. J. 1046 (1968); Dahlke v. Morrison, No. 69-497 (N.D. Ala., Oct. 3,
1969); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, Nos. 5911, 5919,.(M.D. Tenn., Aug. 29, 1969);
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968); Epstein v. Weiss, No. 67-233
(E.D. La., May 13, 1972); Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court, 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d
27 (1967) (involving certified public accountants rather than lawyers). "A corporate
entity acts only for stockholders, and they are entitled to see written communica-
tions and to inquire concerning oral communications between their corporation and its
attorneys." Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. at 511. Under English law a company
is considered to be a trustee for its members (shareholders), and the courts permit
discovery of communications between company officials and the company's solicitors.
Gouraud v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co. 59 L.T.R.(n.s.) 813 (Ch. 1888); W. Dennis &
Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmers' Manure and Chem. Co-op Co. [1943] 1 Ch 220,
digested in 87 Sol. J. 211 (1943). For a criticism of these cases, see Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, supra note 10. See generally Annot.,
34 A.L.R.3d 1106 (1970).
20. Since the corporation is the real plaintiff (the injured party), and since the
privilege is designed to protect the client (the corporation in this case), share-
holders in a derivative action [which is also designed to protect the corpora-
tion] ... should be permitted to show cause why the corporation may not invoke
the attorney-client privilege against, in effect, itself.
45 Tul. L. Rev. 1063, 1068 (1971). Cf. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
21. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated and re-
manded, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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to the corporation. The district court held that a corporation could not
assert the privilege against its own shareholders in an action charging the
corporation, its directors and officers with wrongdoing. 22
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that a corporation is not barred from asserting the attorney-client privilege
simply because those demanding information have the status of shareholders
but that the availability of the privilege for a corporate client is subject to
the right of shareholders to show cause why the privilege should not be
invoked in particular instances; and that the district court had erred in not
holding an evidentiary hearing on the claim of privilege, at which plaintiffs
might have shown good cause why the corporation should not be permitted
to assert the privilege. 23 The court stated that many "indicia" bear on
whether good cause exists, among them the following:
the number of shareholders [calling for the information] and the per-
centage of stock they represent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the
nature of [their] claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the ap-
parent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the informa-
tion and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if the
shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of
action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality;
whether the communication related to past or to prospective actions;
whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself;
the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent
to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; and the risk of revelation
of trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the cor-
poration has an interest for independent reasons.
24
The court of appeals added that the district "court can freely use in camera
inspection or oral examination and freely avail itself of protective orders ...
to preserve confidentiality. ' 25 The court of appeals thereupon vacated the
district court's order on unavailability of the attorney-client privilege and
remanded the cause for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which evi-
dence was adduced by pretrial depositions and exhibits, the court finding the
following facts among others: the corporation had publicly offered its stock
for sale without registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (and strong
evidence indicated it had failed to comply with any exemption from the
registration requirements of that Act); the corporation continued to sell its
stock after the Securities and Exchange Commission staff had requested
assurance that it would discontinue its public offering of unregistered securi-
22. 280 F. Supp. at 1019.
23. 430 F.2d at 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. 430 F.2d at 1104.
25. Id.
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ties; a former president of the corporation had testified that its affairs were
not being conducted in its best interest; important witnesses had refused to
testify, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination; no trade secrets were
involved in the case; and no improper purpose on the part of the shareholders
seeking information had been shown. On the basis of these findings, the court
concluded that the corporation should not be allowed to assert the privilege
against its own shareholders, that the shareholders were entitled to discover
any communications which passed between management and the corpora-
tion's attorney.2 6
Unfortunately, neither the court of appeals nor the district court provide
specific guidance as to how the suggested "indicia" are to be evaluated in
relation to each other or weighed in a closer case against considerations
tending to support preservation of the privilege. The lower court stated with-
out explanation that any one of its seven findings of fact, considered alone,
would "constitute a sufficient basis for granting plaintiffs' [discovery] mo-
tion." 7 Although the reasoning leading to this conclusion is not articulated,
the opinion reveals a striking willingness to find good cause to overcome the
privilege. Under this approach, apparently all the plaintiff in most share-
holder litigation must show to defeat the claim of privilege is a colorable
claim of breach of fiduciary or other duty and need for the requested infor-
mation.
It is still too early to determine whether the approach developed in the
Fifth Circuit will be adopted generally.2 8
WHO' IS THE "CLIENT" OF A CORPORATION'S LAWYER?
The point is sometimes made in arguments to preserve the privilege that
an attorney employed by a corporation in many situations is really advising
the managers and in truth is their personal attorney, 29 that the managers'
26. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499, 502-04 (S.D. Ala. 1972). See Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ("[p]laintiff's claim contained]
substantial allegations of wrongful action by [corporate officer] and others, and the
disclosures sought ha[d] been identified clearly and [were] not available elsewere"
Id. at 214.).
27. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499, 504 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
28. The Garner analysis was followed in Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211
(N.D. 111. 1972). See text accompanying notes 37-40 infra.
During a panel discussion of professional responsibility organized in August, 1975,
by the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, the Chairman of the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recalled that the
ABA had appeared as amicus in favor of the existence of the privilege in Garner and
expressed the personal view that the decision was unfortunate and should be limited
to its facts. Van Dusen, Who Is Counsel's Corporate Client, in Panel Discussion, The
Murky Divide: Professionalism and Professional Responsibility, Business Judgment
and Legal Advice-What Is a Business Lawyer?, 31 Bus Law 457, 474-478 (1975).
29. On the kinds of matter which ultimately do become the subject of derivative
litigation-and thus as to which the issue of attorney-client privilege comes be-
fore the courts-communications with the corporate attorneys have probably
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interests may be adverse to those of some of the shareholders, 0 and that
therefore the managers should be able to claim a personal attorney-client
privilege.3' Although the loyalty of the corporation's attorney in a personal
sense might run to corporate management, his professional obligation is to
the corporation and derivatively to the shareholders as a group, and his du-
ties include protection of legitimate shareholder interests. If an attorney
employed by the corporation and paid with corporate funds helps directors
or majority shareholders to take action adverse to minority shareholders, for
example, if he helps them squeeze out minority shareholders, if he serves
the interests of some of the shareholders to the exclusion of other share-
holders, he should be held to have breached his professional obligations,
at least in the absence of a showing of an overriding corporate justification. 32
The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association stated in Opinion 86:
been concerned with the protection of the directors and officers, as well as the
corporation itself, virtually from the start of discussions.
Burnham, supra note 12, at 904.
In the typical situation, the corporate lawyer does represent the corporate offi-
cers, directors and other employees, as well as the corporation itself-in both
his own mind and theirs-at least until a conflict of interest actually develops.
Id. at 905.
Therefore, such communications will have been made at least in part on the
officers' and directors' own behalf and so-even if we accept the idea that com-
munications made solely on the corporation's behalf are not privileged as against
plaintiff shareholders-there should be a valid privilege in most derivative cases.
Id. at 908.
30, See Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, supra note
10, at 317-19.
31. See Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964) (court
found that company counsel represented both the corporations involved and the cor-
porate employees personally). Cf. United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (where corporation and its president had retained separate counsel at the time
documents were prepared by corporation's counsel, the president could not prevent
corporation from waiving the privilege; the burden of proof to establish the privilege
is on the claimant).
32. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-18 which
provides in part that
[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his alle-
giance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer ... or other person
connected with the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount
its interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by the per-
sonal desires of any person or organization.
For the view that in a situation of possible conflict of interest between management
and shareholders professional ethics should not require counsel to inform shareholders
of his advice to management, see Van Dusen, supra note 28, at 475-76.
A good book is yet to be written on the conflict of interest problems of corporate
counsel, especially counsel for close corporations. Perhaps the best material is Panel
Discussion, The Murky Divide: Professionalism and Professional Responsibility, Busi-
ness Judgment and Legal Advice-What is a Business Lawyer?, 31 Bus. Law. 457
(1975), and panel discussion Business Planning and Professional Responsibility (pts.
1 & 2), 8 Prac. Law 17 (Jan. 1962) and 8 Prac. Law 39 (Feb. 1962). See also Note,
Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants in Derivative Suits, 74 Yale L. J.
524 (1965).
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In acting as the corporation's legal advisor he [the lawyer] must refrain
from taking part in any controversies or factional differences which may
exist among shareholders as to [the corporation's] control. When his
opinion is sought by those entitled to it, or when it becomes his duty to
voice it, he must be in a position to give it without bias or prejudice and
to have it recognized as being so given. 33
Incidentally, in an action against corporate officers or directors, plaintiff-
shareholder's counsel should always move to prevent the corporation's at-
torneys from representing the officers or directors, the real parties defendant,
or the corporation from bearing the cost of their defense on the merits.3 4
EFFECT OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT'S FIDUCIARY DUTIES
An important consideration not present when an attorney's client is an
individual-the high fiduciary duties those in control of the corporate client
owe the corporation and minority shareholders 3 5-should not be lost sight
of in determining whether attorney-client privilege applies in shareholder
litigation. Corporate managers and controlling shareholders after all do not
manage for themselves. Their actions should be calculated to benefit the
corporation and the shareholders as a whole, not to further the personal
interests of the managers or the interests of some of the shareholders over
the interests of other shareholders. As has been pointed out: "In view of
management's general fiduciary capacity, perhaps it would be preferable as
a matter of public policy to allow the decisions as well as the information
upon which they were based to stand on their merits instead of permitting
management to hide behind the attorney-client privilege. ' 36 To give a minor-
ity shareholder access to the corporation's attorney-client communications
is to make more effective the accountability to him of the corporation's man-
agers, who are supposed to be working for him and to be loyal to him but
who so often take action adverse to his interests.
33. Cited in Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 622, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 258
(1975).
34. In a recent federal derivative suit, the court after a careful analysis of the poten-
tial conflict of interest between the individual and corporate defendants concluded that
the "ethical considerations convincingly establish that in a derivative suit the better
course is for the corporation to be represented by independent counsel from the
outset, even though counsel believes in good faith that no conflict of interest exists."
Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See generally
W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 911-14 (4th ed. unabr. 1969); Note,
Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants in Derivative Suits, supra note
32.
35. See F. O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders § 7.13 (1975).
36. Note, Evidence-Good Cause and the Attorney-Client Privilege in Sharehold-
er's Suits, 49 N.C. L. Rev. 802, 807 (1971). "Under [Professor Wigmore's test re-
quiring a balancing of 'injury' against 'benefit derived'], a balance already delicate
when the client is an individual is made even more so because of the danger of abuse
in the corporate setting and the special fiduciary role of corporate management." Id.
at 808.
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The importance that is to be attached to the fiduciary duties owed by
corporate officers to minority shareholders in determining whether the
attorney-client privilege applies to communications between corporate of-
ficers and the corporation's attorney is illustrated by an interesting federal
case. 37 Apparently no court had dealt with the precise fact situation before.
Company A was in the process of acquiring control of Company B by pur-
chasing controlling stock in B from the estate of Company B's founder, X.
On May 16, by the vote of X's executor, Company A's senior vice president,
Y, was installed as president and chairman of the board of Company B. On
June 6 Company A purchased Company B's assets and the stock held by
X's estate. Plaintiff, a former chief operating officer and director of Company
B, brought suit under the federal securities laws, claiming that he had a
contract to purchase Company B and that Company A and X's family and
executor had conspired to breach his contract rights. At an oral deposition,
Y refused to answer plaintiff's questions about conversations between Y and
Company A's attorney between May 16 and June 6 concerning Company A's
asquisition of Company B. Y Claimed that the conversations were shielded
by the attorney-client privilege, as Y was still an officer of Company A and
the conversations were communications between Y and that corporation's
attorney about the corporation's legal affairs. Weighing the possible injury to
management and shareholders who were not parties to the action against
the benefits to be obtained by plaintiff, the court decided in favor of dis-
closure. The court stated that "[t]he important consideration was that man-
agement's duties gave the shareholders a sufficient interest in knowing its
legal communications to outweigh the interests served by confidentiality.
That interest is even stronger where an executive's communications have
been with counsel for a party whose interests are potentially adverse to those
of the executive's shareholders, as here. '38 Y was under a continuing duty to
plaintiff between May 16 and June 6, the court said, and as long as that duty
continued "so did the concomitant interest" of the Company B shareholders
in knowing Y's "legal communications concerning the future of their com-
pany."3 9 In weighing the pro's and con's of disclosure, the court took into
consideration that plaintiff's claim contained substantial allegations of wrong-
ful action by Y and others, that plaintiff had clearly identified the disclosures
sought, and that the information sought was not available elsewhere. 40
37. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
38. Id. at 213-14.
39. Id. at 214.
40. Another attorney-client privilege issue was before the court in this case. Com-
pany B's lawyer had "testified . . . that he had been retained by [Company A]
subsequent to the acquisition [of Company B], in connection with its purchase of a
foreign company, but that he never received any money or promise of money from
anyone other than [X's] estate for any work [he did in Company A's takeover of
Company B]. ... Plaintiff's position [was] that [the attorney's] fees from [Com-
pany A] may have been a reward for improper cooperation in the [takeover of
Company B]." The attorney refused to answer questions about the amount of his
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE: THE "JOINT ATTORNEY"
Even if a court cannot be persuaded to deny the attorney-client privilege
in a suit brought by a shareholder, the attorney representing the share-
holder may be able to gain access to attorney-client communications by tak-
ing advantage of established exceptions to the privilege, some of which be-
come applicable with considerable frequency in shareholder litigation. The
following paragraphs outline these exceptions and explain how a minority
shareholder's lawyer can use them.
A long-established exception to the attorney-client privilege, the "joint
attorney" exception, 41 provides some support for precluding the corporation
from asserting the privilege in a suit brought by a shareholder. The "joint
attorney" exception is stated by Wigmore as follows: "[W]hen the same
attorney acts for two parties having a common interest, and each party com-
municates with him . . . the communications . . . are not privileged in a
controversy between the two original parties, inasmuch as the common
interest and employment forbade concealment by either from the other.
4 2
An attorney employed by a corporation is, of course, not strictly a "joint
attorney" of the corporation and suing shareholders. But at least some of the
situations in which the "joint attorney" exception has been applied provide
analogies for denying the privilege in a controversy between the corporation
and some of its shareholders. For example, in litigation between partners
the privilege has been denied to communications by one of the partners to the
firm's attorney.4" Further, the reason giving rise to the "joint attorney"
exception applies, at least in part, to shareholder litigation when the privilege
is invoked to deny access to communications to and from the corporation's
attorney. A corporation's shareholders have an interest in the corporation
which justifies their having access to communications about its affairs. An
attorney employed by a corporation should serve not just the corporate
entity but the shareholders as a group. His efforts should be exerted for the
benefit of all. This view has been challenged as inconsistent with the concept
of corporate entity,44 but the obvious answer lies in the well-established
proposition that "the separate personality of a corporation . . . will be dis-
fees from Company A or the existence of any memorandum setting forth his agree-
ment with Company A. The court ordered the attorney to respond to plaintiff's ques-
tions, holding that "[iun the absence of unusual circumstances, the amount of an
attorney's fee and the conditions of his employment do not come within the attorney-
client privilege." Id. at 214.
41. See Grand Trunk W.R.R. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116F.2d 823, 835, rehearing
denied 118 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1941); Benson v. Custer, 236 Iowa 345, 351-52,
17 N.W.2d 889, 892 (1945); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 151 Neb. 113, 36 N.W.2d 637 (1949).
42. 8 J. Wigmore § 2312, at 603-04.
43. Billias v. Panageotou, 193 Wash. 523, 76P.2d 987 (1938) (in an action for
dissolution of partnership communications which had been made to the partnership
attorney were not privileged).
44. See Burnham, supra note 12, at 912.
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regarded or 'pierced' whenever the corporate form is employed to evade an
obligation, . . . perpetrate a fraud or crime, or gain an unjust advantage or
commit an injustice. '45
EXCEPTIONS: COMMUNICATIONS FOR PURPOSE OF COMMITTING
CRIME OR FRAUD
A firmly established exception to the attorney-client privilege "is that
communications made by a client to his attorney during or before the com-
mission of a crime or fraud for the purpose of being guided or assisted in its
commission are not privileged. '46 The courts appear to be gradually broad-
ening this exception. A federal district court has indicated that the exception
covers communications "for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; '47
and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has commented that it does
"not consider unavailability of the privilege to be confined to the narrow
ground of prospective criminal transactions. The differences between pro-
spective crime and prospective action of questionable legality, or prospective
fraud, are differences of degree, not of principle. ' 48 Indeed, in the Fifth Cir-
cuit the privilege seemingly "may be overcome, not only where fraud or
crime is involved, but also where there are other substantial abuses of the
attorney-client relationship. '49
45. 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations: Law and Practice § 1.09a (2d ed. 1971).
46. Hyde Constr Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 1972). See
Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1967); Pollock v. United States,
202F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Bob, 106F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948),
modified in part 184 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1950), vacated as moot and remanded for
dismissal, 340 U.S. 908 (1951). See also ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1).
47. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass
1950) (dictum) (emphasis supplied). Accord Uniform Rule of Evidence 26 (1953
version). For other decisions that have adopted the "crime or tort" formulation in
dictum, see Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972); International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Dura Corp. v.
Milwaukee Hydraulic Prods., Inc., 37 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D. Wis. 1965); Paper Con-
verting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963). But see
proposed Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 503(d) (1) (crime
or fraud) (the proposed Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, were transmitted to Con-
gress by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972; although the rules were not adopted
by Congress they will probably serve as a guide for the federal courts).
48. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
We recognize the much stronger policy justifications behind the confidentiality
of communications with one who is already a wrongdoer and seeks legal ad-
vice appropriate to his plight as opposed to one who seeks advice concerning
proposed future conduct and, having later acted, seeks to maintain the secrecy.
Id. 1103, n. 20.
49. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla.
1973). In Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974) (not a
shareholder litigation case) the court adhered to the traditional requirement of a
showing of crime or fraud, stating that the privilege would not be "abrogated by
allegations, however well supported, of misuse." Id. at 41.
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This expanding exception to the attorney-client privilege is available to
plaintiffs in a high percentage of shareholder suits. Certainly plaintiffs in
shareholder litigation should have at least as much opportunity as plaintiffs
in other kinds of litigation to overcome the attorney-client privilege by a
prima facie showing that the client's communications to the lawyer were
made in contemplation of crime, fraud or tort.50 Plaintiffs are aided in this
endeavor by the willingness of the courts "freely [to] use in camera inspec-
tion or oral examination"' in order to determine the appropriateness of the
claim of privilege. 52 Often shareholder complaints involve alleged violations
by controlling shareholders, corporate directors, officers of federal or state
securities laws or other criminal conduct. In other instances, shareholder
grievances involve acts by controlling shareholders or corporate executives
which defraud the minority shareholders or the corporation. The plaintiff
in a shareholder's suit perhaps increases the chances of a court's applying
the crime-fraud exception if he alleges a conspiracy by controlling share-
holders, corporate directors, and officers, and the corporation's lawyers and
accountants to defraud him.5 3
50. Courts in the United States have not followed the older English rule that the
mere charge of illegality overcomes the privilege. Many American cases stress the
necessity of plaintiffs' making out a prima facie case of criminal activity or fraud as
a prerequisite to setting aside the privilege. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 14 (1933) (mere charge of wrongdoing without more will not avail; "[tihere must
be a showing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the light should
be let in"); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967) ("The
attorney-client privilege is withdrawn upon a prima facie showing that the lawyer's
advice was designed to serve his client in commission of a fraud or crime"); United
States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939) (the
court emphasized the necessity of plaintiffs' making out a prima facie case, stating
that "the mere assertion of an intended crime or fraud is not enough"): The courts'
interpretations of what constitutes a "prima facie case" have not been uniform. See,
e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972) ("sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding that the challenged communications were made in furtherance of a
crime or tort"); Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1953) ("evi-
dence . . . introduced giving color to the charge") SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp.
226, 232 (D.D.C. 1948) (evidence sufficient "to reasonably justify a verdict of
wrongdoing which could be sustained").
51. Garner v. Wolfinbarger 430 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis
original). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
52. Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested in Garner, id., that the
trial court use in camera inspection of alleged privileged communications, apparently
the lower court did not do so before or during the subsequent evidentiary hearing.
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972). See text accompanying
notes 25-26 supra. Other courts have used the procedure. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v.
International Bus. Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (each party ordered
to submit to a Special Master in camera one copy of each "privileged" or "work
product" document sought by the other party); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp.,
65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974) (use of Special Master); International Tel & Tel. Corp.
v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (the court ordered in camera
inspection of answers to interrogatories and documents in question).
53. See F. O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders § 7.10 (1975). See also
Proposed ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responsibilities and Liabilities
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WHICH CORPORATE AGENTS SPEAK AS THE "CLIENT"?
As a corporation can act only through agents, a question arises as to which
corporate agents, when they communicate with the corporation's attorney,
speak on a privileged basis. Are communications from any corporate agent
covered by the privilege or only communications from certain agents? The
courts and the commentators have given various answers.5 4 At one time some
courts held that a communication could come from any corporate officer
or agent and still be privileged. 55 More recently the courts have developed
two tests for determining which corporate agents may speak as the "client."
A number of lower federal courts and some state courts have formulated a
so-called "control group test," 56 under which a corporation can claim a privi-
lege only if the corporate officer or employee communicating information to
the attorney has the power to decide, or is an "authorized member" of the
group with power to decide, "any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney. '57 Under this test, if a corporate employee
at the time he communicates information to the corporation's attorney is
not in a position to participate in the decision in aid of which the attorney's
advice is being sought, his communications are not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has laid down a more expansive test which sustains the privilege
when the employee's communication is made "at the direction of his supe-
riors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attor-
ney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communica-
tion is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment. '58
when Advising with Respect to Laws Administered by the SEC, 31 Bus. Law. 471
(1975).
54. See Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 Prac. Law., 15,
18-19 (Nov. 1969); Annot., 9 A.L.R. Fed. 685 (1971).
55. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del.
1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
56. Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Hogan v.
Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Okla. 1967), afl'd sub nor Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d
686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.
Cal. 1963) (corporation's officers, directors and department heads considered part
of "control group"); Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App.2d 52, 199 N.E. 2d 802
(1964). See Note, supra note 7 (supporting the test). For criticism of the test, see
Burnham, supra note 2 at 545-548 (1968); Heininger, supra note 8 at 384-86 (1965).
57. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.
Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). For cases giving a
broader definition than the "control group" test of who is a representative of a cor-
porate client, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Mass. 1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954); D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v, Superior Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468,
388 P.2d 700 (1964).
58. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)
afl'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348, reh. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
The court commented that a corporation's employee,
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This decision was affirmed by an evenly divided Supreme Court.59 As this
evenly divided affirmance is without effects as a precedent, both standards
continue to be applied.60
TERMINATION OF PRIVILEGE BY DISCLOSURE OR WAIVER
When the attorney-client privilege is invoked, the plaintiff may be able to
defeat the claim of privilege by showing that the communications were not
intended to be confidential or have not actually been treated with confiden-
tiality or that the privilege has been waived. The attorney-client privilege
applies only to confidential communications. Communications otherwise
covered by the attorney-client privilege are not privileged if the client and
attorney disclose or intend to disclose to third persons the information con-
tained in the communications. 61 Thus communications made by a client to
his attorney with the understanding that the attorney is to impart to a third
party the information contained in the communications are not privileged.6 2
Further, a communication between attorney and client privileged at the time
made may lose its privilege because of subsequent waiver or loss of confi-
dentiality. For example, where a corporation permitted government repre-
though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the
corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged
where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors
in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's ad-
vice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is a
performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.
Id. The court, however, apparently would deny the privilege if the communication is
on a matter as to which the communicating employees "are virtually indistinguishable
from bystander witnesses," id. at 491, or if the information which the employees con-
veyed to the attorney was information which the employees obtained "fortuitously."
Id. See also Comment, The Privileged Few: The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied
to Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 288 (1972) (suggesting a solution combining
what the author asserts are the favorable features of the control group test and the
Harper & Row test).
59. 400 U.S. 348, reh. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
60. Compare, e.g., Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa 1973)
(adopting the Seventh Circuit test) with Eutectic Corp. v. Metro, Inc., 61 F.R.D.
35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) and Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md.
1974) (requiring the control group test).
61. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United
States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 E.D. Mich. 1954).
A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third per-
sons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication.
Proposed Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 503(a)(4)
(transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, but not
adopted by Congress; see note 47 supra). Cf. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D. Del. 1962) (receipt of information from other
sources than the client).
62. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Il. 1955); Rediker
v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Cf. In re Ruos, 159 F. 252, 256-57 (E.D.
Pa. 1908) (information received from third parties).
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sentatives to examine its files, including communications to and from its
"house counsel," any privilege which might have attached to those com-
munications was lifted by the corporation's voluntarily making them avail-
able. 63 Similarly, a plaintiff-witness waives the privilege as to documents by
using them to refresh his recollection.6 4 Indeed, the mere filing of privileged
documents in the corporation's general files may destroy the privilege. 65 On
the other hand, disclosure of privileged information during settlement nego-
tiations waives only such information as is disclosed during negotiations;66 it
does not open up other lawyer-client communications to discovery.
The requirement that communications must be kept confidential in order
to retain their confidential status is difficult to comply with in a large cor-
poration. The nature and structure of the modern public-issue corporation
normally lead to distribution of some attorney communications to a con-
siderable number of people within the corporate organization. "To be effec-
tive, communications to and from the 'lawyers' seem to require broad
distribution within the company. '67 The precise extent to which documents
containing legal advice from a corporation's attorney or communications to
him from corporate employees may be circulated within the corporate
organization without loss of the attorney-client privilege is far from settled."
Two federal district courts have recently held that:
63. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich.
1954).
64. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
65. See id. at 465 (dictum). Cf. Cote v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 160 Misc. 658, 290
N.Y.S. 483 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1936).
66. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 45 (D. Md. 1974), Interna-
tional Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10 (D. Del. 1968). In
American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972) the
court states:
Negotiated settlements are to be encouraged, and bargaining and argument pre-
cede such settlements. Clients and lawyers should not have to fear that positions
on legal issues taken during negotiations waive the attorney-client privilege
so that the private opinions and reports drafted by an attorney for his client
become discoverable.
67. Withrow, How to Preserve the Privilege, 15 Prac. Law. 30, 34 (Nov. 1969).
68. See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Kelsey-
Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (dictum); Kobak, supra note
6 at 371-372; Comment, The Lawyer Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,
the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rev. 235, 248 (1961)
(suggesting that disclosure should be permitted within the corporation on a "need to
know" basis without destroying the privilege). Cf. 8 In 1 Pet Prods., Inc. v. Swift &
Co., 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see also United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp.
490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) (as the privilege does not apply to materials intended to be in-
cluded in a tax return, a court will order the production of income and expense sum-
maries prepared by the client and the attorney's work papers made in preparing the
return); cf. In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afj'd 306 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (books and papers turned over to an
attorney by a taxpayer-client are not privileged, but hand written materials prepared
by the client to use in consulting with the attorney are privileged). But see United
States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Neb. 1970). "[A] more realistic rule
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S.. where the dominant purpose of the communication is to facilitate
the rendition of legal services to the client, and the communication it-
self or the substance thereof is transmitted to the lawyer shortly there-
after, the fact that the communication, at its inception, is within the
corporate structure rather than directly with the attorney does not auto-
matically defeat the privilege.69
As the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, the client is the
appropriate party to waive it. The attorney has no right to disclose confi-
dential communications without the client's consent. However, a corpora-
tion's attorney, especially a member of the corporation's law department,
usually has implied authority from the client to disclose confidential infor-
mation, thus destroying the privilege, or to perform other acts that will waive
the privilege. For example, insertion by the corporation's lawyer of a ref-
erence to a privileged communication in pleadings he files in court has been
held to constitute a waiver of the privilege.7 0
INAPPLICABILITY OF PRIVILEGE TO BUSINESS ADVICE
Business advice given by a lawyer is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege."1 "The privilege applies to protect only those communications
prompted by the need for advice on legal matters; no privilege is available
if the firm seeks only nonlegal advice."'7 2 Thus a question may arise as to
whether a communication from a corporation is legal and privileged or non-
legal and not privileged. 7 When a lawyer's advice relates to a mixture of
business and facts, as it frequently does, the tendency of the courts is to pre-
serve the privilege. Judge Wyzanski has commented:
would be that the client intends that only as much of the information will be con-
veyed to the government as the attorney concludes should be, and ultimately is, sent
to the government. In short, whatever is finally sent to the government is what matches
the client's intent").
69. Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 39 (D. Md. 1974).
Those documents which are prepared at the direction of members of the con-
trol group to aid counsel in rendering legal assistance to the corporation, at
the express or implied request of counsel, and which are primarily legal in
nature, will not fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege merely
because at their inception the communications were intracorporate.
id.
70. See Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). For possible waiver of
the privilege by the attorney's discussion with other attorneys, see Note, Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 Yale L. J.
1030 (1954).
71. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del
1954).
72. Note, supra note 7 at 428. See also Pye, supra note 54 at 20; 8 Wigmore
§§ 2300-12.
73. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
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The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not only
what is permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in the public
interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more than predicter
of legal consequences. His duty to society as well as to his client in-
volves many relevant social, economic, political and philosophical con-
siderations. And the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because
relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a communica-
tion which also includes legal advice.74
Nevertheless, where advice given by a lawyer is predominantly business in
nature, a court may very well decide that the privilege does not protect it.75
Whenever "the nonlegal reasons for communicating the information to the
lawyer are strong enough that the communication would occur regardless
of privilege, the privilege cannot be justified as an inducement to com-
munication.""'
COMMUNICATIONS TO INSIDE COUNSEL
Although members of corporation law departments ("house counsel" or
"inside counsel") are usually considered "attorneys" for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege,77 communications from corporate officers or other
employees seeking advice from a member of the corporation's own legal
department are perhaps more likely to be classified by the courts as "busi-
ness" communications, not subject to the privilege, than are communications
between corporate employees and independent, outside counsel. 78 In the
74. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950). "A lawyer, in private practice or as house counsel, must have regard for the
business consequences of his advice or he is not doing his job properly." Brereton,
Abrogation of the Corporate Privilege in Stockholder Suits, 15 Prac. Law, at 24, 28
(Nov. 1969).
75. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792,
794 (D. Del. 1954).
76. Note, supra note 7 at 428.
77. Natta v. Hogan, 392F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon
Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36 (D. Md. 1974); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Mass. 1950). But cf. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Del. 1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954). In Burlington Industries the court held
that for the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, a person can be both attorney
and client for different communications.
[Lit is possible for "in-house" counsel to be the sole counsel with respect to cer-
tain advisory communications, and co-counsel with outside attorneys for other
communications. It is also possible for 'in-house' counsel, as a member of the
corporate control group, to personify the corporate client in seeking legal ad-
vice from "outside" counsel.
65 F.R.D. at 37.
78. In theory, courts agree the communications (sic) to or from house counsel are
as privileged as communications from other counsel. In practice, however,
many courts recoil from attaching the privilege as freely to house counsel be-
cause of the high probability that house counsel will be dispensing business,
rather than legal advice.
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first place, some courts, perhaps improperly, are inclined to look upon an
attorney employed in a corporate law department as being more a business-
man than a lawyer, and they are reluctant to treat his activity as legal work.
As the inside counsel is "located at the corporation's office and paid directly
by the corporation, [he] starts out looking more like a businessman and,
as a result, finds it harder to convince a court that in particular instances he
was acting as a lawyer."' 9 Furthermore, corporate executives more often call
upon inside lawyers than outside lawyers for business advice. Members of
corporate law departments, in the course of giving legal advice, frequently
participate in company conferences at which business decisions are made.
Inside lawyers "can rarely confine themselves to purely legal matters. Ques-
tions of policy, as well as executive guidance for matters that are partly
legal, often fall within their domain." 0
COMMUNICATIONS TO LAWYER-MANAGERS
A corporation's lawyer often become a part of its management team. The
general counsel of a company may become a member of the board of direc-
tors and serve on committees of the board. He may even become an officer,
typically a vice president. Indeed, in some companies, usually smaller com-
panies, a lawyer acts as both general counsel and president. If a corporation's
lawyer plays on the management team, courts are somewhat more ready to
deny the protection of the attorney-client privilege to communications be-
tween him and other corporate employees. As a leading member of the New
York City Bar has observed:
Kobak, supra note 7 at 353.
If inside counsel is negotiating a contract on behalf of his corporation, the in-
structions which the board of directors may give him as to the terms to be
incorporated in the negotiations probably are not privileged. However, if dur-
ing the negotiations the board of directors requests the advice of counsel as
to the legality or tax consequences of certain provisions to be included, this
communication and the opinion of the attorney is privileged because he is
wearing his "lawyer's suit."
Heininger, supra note 8 at 381.
79. Burnham, supra note 2 at 543. See also American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 89 n. 20 (D. Del. 1962) (memorandum prepared by
patent department employee was held not legal advice, although it might have been
"if outside lawyers were performing the same task"); United States v. Swift & Co.,
24 F.R.D. 280 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (holding that material prepared by house counsel
in the ordinary course of business is not included in his work product: for purposes
of the "work product" rule, even though litigation was pending at the time the material
was prepared).
80. Simon, The Attorney Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale
L.J. 953, 969 (1956). For the possible effect on the attorney-client privilege of the
way in which a corporate law department is organized, for example, whether the law
department is "divisionalized," with lawyers in the department "reporting to" the
managers of "autonomous" divisions in the enterprise, see Schaefer, The Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Modern Business Corporation, 20 Bus. Law. 989 (1965).
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... it is very difficult for an attorney to be a "lawyer-manager" without
losing, sooner or later, and perhaps imperceptibly, his professional
status. It takes very little imagination to conclude, and available au-
thorities confirm, that such loss of the professional relationship has been
and will be, increasingly relied upon by the courts to curtail the attor-
ney-client privilege in favor of more "liberal" discovery notions. s'
A claim of attorney-client privilege when corporate counsel are also mem-
bers of management additionally raises related problems of conflict of interest
and fiduciary duty. Clearly, corporate officers and directors owe a high
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. 82 Whenever a corpo-
ration, in a sense, acts as its own counsel through lawyer-members of its
management team, the assertion of the lawyer-client privilege to block in-
quiry into management's performance of its duties is singularly inappro-
priate. A recent, well-reasoned federal case 83 examines the dual lawyer-
control group role and concludes:
When dealing with the corporation's business, the policy of the law
imposing exacting fiduciary duties and responsibilities upon the cor-
poration's officers and directors must override the assertion of confi-
dentiality and privilege in reliance on the fact that the individuals also
happen to be lawyers.8 4
In the context of such a dual role, the requisite professional confidential
relationship is highly unlikely. "When the attorney and the client get in
bed together as business partners, their relationship is a business relationship,
not a professional one, and their confidences are business confidences un-
protected by a professional privilege. 85
COMMUNICATIONS TO ACCOUNTANTS
Communications between corporate officials and accountants are even
more readily subject to discovery than are communications between cor-
porate officials and attorneys. 'Under federal law and at common law no
privilege exists between an accountant and his client which would preclude
production of an accountant's work papers or his being compelled to tes-
tify. 86 An accountant-client privilege has been created in some states by
81. Id. at 995. See also United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751
(D. Del. 1943) (communication of business advice by attorney, who was also general
manager of client, held not privileged).
82. See text accompanying notes 35 and 36 supra.
83. Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537 (D. Nev.
1972).
84. Id. at 545.
85. Id. at 546.
86. Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
864 (1953); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd 306 F.2d 633
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Boccuto, 175
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statute,"7 but in a leading case interpreting a Colorado statute which pro-
tected from disclosure confidential communications between accountant and
client, the court held that the statute does not apply in a suit brought by
shareholders of the corporation.88 The court commented as follows: "Certi-
fied public accountants hired by a corporation are hired for the benefit of
all of its stockholders and such employment forbids concealment from the
stockholders of information given the accountant by the corporation."8 9
Furthermore, even if an accountant-client privilege exists under state law
and applies to actions brought in state courts by shareholders of the corpo-
rate client, a minority shareholder can defeat the privilege if he can sue in
a federal court and assert claims predicated upon alleged violations of
federal law (e.g., the federal securities laws), because then the existence or
non-existence of a privilege will be determined by federal law, which, as has
been pointed out, does not recognize an accountant-client privilege. 90
In some circumstances, communications to or from a corporation's ac-
countant may come within the attorney-client privilege. 91 If communications
have been transmitted "in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice from the lawyer, '92 the attorney-client privilege shields the communi-
cations from disclosure. The communications are not privileged if the advice
sought relates not to legal but to accounting services, or if the accountant,
F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed for lack of juris., 274F.2d 860 (3d Cir.
1959). See generally Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Account-
ing, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1264 (1968).
87. Driver, The Inside General Counsel's Response to Auditors' Inquiries, 30 Bus.
Law. (March 1975) 217, 219 n. 4 states that seventeen states provide by statute for
an accountant privilege: Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., La., Md., Mich.,
Mo., Mont., Nev., N.M., Penn., and Tenn. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-749 (Supp.
1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(f) (1973).
88. Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court, 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967). See also
W. Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk' Farmers' Manure & Chem. Co-Op Co.,
[1943] 1 Ch 220.
89. 161 Colo. at 498-99, 423 P.2d at 30.
90. Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In Basch
v. Talley Indus., Civil No. 70-4144 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 1, 1971) a private action
under the federal securities laws in which the defendant corporation invoked an ac-
countant-client privilege created by an Arizona statute, Judge Ryan stated:
[T]he claims asserted in this action are predicated upon alleged violations of a
federal statute which has nationwide application and is not subject to local law,
which is not uniform. I hold that the admission of evidence and the extent of
any privilege is to be determined by federal law, which does not recognize
a privileged confidential relationship between an accountant and one who em-
ploys him.
Cf. United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970); Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
For a discussion of the applicable law of privilege in the federal courts, see Kobak,
supra note 7 at 341-52.
91. See e.g., United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Judson, 322F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Kovel, 296F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1961); United States v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 444 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444 (D. Minn. 1971).
92. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (emphasis original).
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not the lawyer, provides the desired information.9 3 The courts have recog-
nized that some arbitrary lines may be drawn; but, "that is the inevitable
consequence of having to reconcile the absence of a privilege for accountants
and the effective operation of the . . . [attorney-client privilege] under con-
ditions where the lawyer needs outside help. '94
93. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). In Brown, the accountant's handwritten notes prepared
at a meeting attended by client, accountant and attorney were held not privileged
where accountant had been retained by client not lawyer, accountant's presence had
been requested by client, and there was insufficient showing that notes represented
attorney-client communication.
94. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.

